


# ARMS CONTROL AFRICA



## Editorial

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Welcome to the first Issue of the third volume of Arms Control: Africa, which is published by the Arms Management Programme (AMP) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The aim of Arms Control: Africa is to provide relevant information and analysis on arms control developments that are either taking place in Africa, or have the potential to have a significant impact on the continent.

This issue focuses on recent arms control developments undertaken by African States. The first quarter of 2011 has shown significant progress with regard to Africa's participation in international arms control and disarmament agreements. The global trade in conventional weapons remains poorly regulated as there is no set of internationally agreed standards that exists to ensure that arms are only transferred for appropriate use. Many governments have voiced concern about the absence of globally agreed rules for all States to guide their decisions on arms transfers. That is why they have started negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty. In 2006, the United Nations General Assembly requested countries to submit their views on such a treaty. More than 100 countries did. The Secretary-General collected these views in a 2007 report on the issue. In 2008 a Group of Governmental Experts produced a report on the topic. In 2009 an Open-ended Working Group – open to all States – held two meetings on an arms trade treaty. A total of six sessions of this Group were planned.

At the end of 2009 the General Assembly decided to convene a Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 “to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international

standards for the transfer of conventional arms”. The General Assembly also indicated that the remaining four sessions of the Open-ended Working Group should be considered as sessions of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for this Conference. The first PrepCom took place in July 2010. In 2011, PrepComs were held on 28 February-4 March, and 11-15 July.

Importantly, from 21 to 22 February 2011, representatives from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states attended a two-day workshop in Pretoria, South Africa, on weapons marking. The workshop, hosted by the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), introduced participants to the principles of “pinstamping”, the process of physically marking firearms with a unique identification code that allows for easier tracking and tracing of weapons and is the first of its kind within the region.

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Editor: Gugu Dube

**Contributions** to future issues of Arms Control: Africa are welcome and should focus on matters relating to small arms and light weapons, conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Articles in French, Portuguese, Swahili and Arabic are also welcome. Submissions should be no longer than 1,500 words in length. Contributions should be emailed to [aca@issafrica.org](mailto:aca@issafrica.org).

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**L**e commerce incontrôlé et la fourniture anarchique des armes est un problème international avec des répercussions désastreuses sur la sécurité des citoyens du monde et le bien être en général des populations civiles pacifiques n'aspirant qu'à vivre normalement dans un environnement sain et sécurisé propice au développement.

Les armes qui tombent entre des mauvaises mains entretiennent les conflits qui empêchent l'accès aux services de santé, aux champs, et à l'éducation. A court et long terme cela provoque, la pauvreté et la mauvaise gouvernance. La culture de violence, et l'anarchie s'installent plus facilement prenant en otage la démocratie et provoquant l'arrêt du développement.

C'est pour toutes ces raisons que nombre d'Etats africains et les acteurs de la société civile africaine se sont joints au groupe d'ONGs internationaux comprenant entre autres, Oxfam, Amnesty International, IANSA, pour lancer le 09 octobre 2003, l'initiative d'une campagne mondiale sur le contrôle du commerce des armes. L'objectif final étant de permettre l'adoption d'un traité sur le commerce des armes par les Etats membres de l'ONU.

Il est urgent pour la communauté internationale d'adopter des mesures de contrôle effectives et contraignantes en vue de prévenir et d'empêcher que les armes tombent dans les mains des groupes de criminels organisés susceptibles de déstabiliser les Etats.

## *Africa's perspectives on the Arms Trade Treaty*

Conscients de cela, les gouvernements africains, avec le soutien des organisations de la société civile ont entrepris des actions concrètes visant à réduire le trafic illicite des armes notamment les armes légères. En Afrique de l'ouest, les Etats membres de la CEDEAO qui avaient adopté en 1998, un moratoire sur l'importation, l'exportation et la fabrication des armes légères pour une période de trois ans renouvelable ont décidé de transformer le moratoire en un instrument juridique contraignant. Depuis juin 2006, la convention a été adoptée par les 15 pays membres de la CEDEAO. Elle est entrée en vigueur en septembre 2009.

En Afrique centrale, des Etats Membres de la CEEAC sous l'impulsion du Comité Consultatif permanent des Nations Unies sur les questions de sécurité ont adopté une convention régionale et un plan d'action de mise en œuvre de la convention de l'Afrique centrale.

Même si les accords régionaux sont pertinents et prennent en compte les spécificités régionales, on constate que certains pays ne font partie d'aucun de ces accords régionaux. Aussi il n'existe pas encore un accord régional africain contraignant liant tous les pays où le risque de diversion des armes d'une région à une autre notamment aux régions volatiles de l'Afrique de l'ouest, de l'Afrique de l'Est et de l'Afrique centrale. Car le circuit illicite des armes ne respecte pas les frontières, qui au passage sont poreuses, les armes qui quittent le Sudan, le Chad ou la Somalie pourraient facilement se retrouver en Afrique de l'ouest, au Niger, au Mali etc...

Chaque accord régional est limité dans sa capacité d'empêcher des transferts d'armes illicites dans un monde de plus en plus globalisé. Bien que ces divers accords régionaux puissent définir différentes normes qui tiennent compte des besoins régionaux, nous avons néanmoins besoin de normes globales communes pour corriger certaines lacunes constatées dans le commerce des armes au niveau international.

Nous savons qu'il y a de la volonté politique à contrôler efficacement les transferts internationaux des armes, parce que 153 Etats ont voté en faveur du début de négociation sur cette question à l'Assemblée Générale en 2006, et 99 Etats membres ont soumis au Secrétaire Général de l'ONU, leurs vues sur la faisabilité, les paramètres et la

portée d'un traité sur le commerce armes. Sous l'Egide de l'ONU, un comité d'experts est chargé d'examiner les différentes positions des Etats membres et de proposer pour adoption un projet de traité de commerce des armes consensuel.

Pour les Etats africains, certaines questions pratiques mériteraient d'être abordées. Prenons par exemple la question du certificat d'utilisation finale, l'état actuel de l'établissement et de la vérification du certificat d'utilisation final demeure insatisfaisant. En effet, la vérification de l'utilisation finale des armes est toujours un processus ad hoc. Les certificats sont souvent de simples notes verbales sur papier qui peuvent être facilement falsifiés. Des certificats d'utilisation finaux ont été effectivement falsifiés ; et les circuits de transport frauduleux par la mer, par avion ou terrestre ont été utilisés pour contourner les embargos et transférer des armes dans les zones de conflits.

Concernant la portée des transferts couverts, les pays africains en grande majorité considèrent que le TCA pourrait couvrir l'importation, l'exportation, le transit, le transbordement et le transport ou tout autre mouvement à partir ou à travers le territoire d'un Etat ». Les pays de la CEDEAO par exemple ont trouvé utile cette caractéristique de la portée des transferts couverts pour un future TCA.

Ces différentes positions ont été confirmées par le Groupe d'Experts gouvernementaux mis en place par la résolution 61/89 de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies chargé d'examiner la faisabilité, la portée et les paramètres d'un futur TCA. Les experts ont étudié les types d'activités ou d'opérations qui pourraient être incluses dans un éventuel traité. Ils ont notamment évoqué les types d'activités ou d'opérations suivants : exportation, importation, transfert, réexportation, passage en transit, transbordement, octroi de licences, transport, transfert et fabrication de technologies, et production sous licence à l'étranger, ainsi que des moyens d'empêcher la réexportation illicite, la fabrication et le transfert sans licence, le courtage illicite d'armes et le transfert d'armes à des acteurs non étatiques. Ils ont mentionné aussi les arsenaux et la fabrication d'armes classiques, compte tenu du respect des droits des États concernant la

non-ingérence dans leurs affaires intérieures.

Concernant la portée des armes couvertes, ceci devrait également être aussi large comme possible couvrant toutes les armes classiques.

Les armes légères, parmi les armes classiques, ayant été cause d'immenses souffrances humaines et d'instabilité politique dans différentes parties du monde, les Experts gouvernementaux de l'ONU ont été d'avis qu'il fallait trouver le moyen de faire cesser le commerce illicite et les transferts illicites de ces armes à des acteurs non étatiques.

Bien que les armes de petit calibre aient été les plus utilisées dans les conflits en Afrique, les différents rapports de l'ONU et institutions spécialisées montrent qu'il n'y a presque aucune limite au type d'armes utilisées par les groupes armés. Des groupes armés en Afrique ont pu avoir accès aux avions de chasse d'avions, aux hélicoptères de combat, aux chars de combat, aux véhicules blindés de transport de troupes et aux armes lourdes comprenant les armes antichar et les missiles sol-air.

Concernant des paramètres, les experts gouvernementaux de l'ONU ont évoqué la nécessité de traiter des thèmes suivants : le terrorisme; la criminalité organisée et autres activités délictueuses; le maintien de la stabilité régionale; la promotion

du développement socioéconomique; les transferts illicites à des acteurs non étatiques, la réexportation sans autorisation, la fabrication sans licence, le courtage illicite; le droit de fabrication et d'importation; l'utilisation finale et assurances sur l'utilisation finale; le détournement; le respect des embargos sur les armes imposés par le Conseil de sécurité et des autres obligations internationales, en tant que condition nécessaire de tout transfert. Les Etats africains souhaitent que soient développées des normes susceptibles d'empêcher des désastres humanitaires et des abus de droits de l'homme. Car les civils innocents meurent chaque jour et le développement durable est en jeu. Par exemple, la République Démocratique du Congo et la Sierra Leone sont deux pays très riches en ressources minières et qui ont le potentiel de figurer parmi les pays les plus riches dans le monde, mais le Congo est classé 168 sur 177 selon l'index du développement humain du PNUD et la Sierra Leone est 177 soit le plus pauvre sur les 177 pays classés. Ces Etats demeurent pauvres et sous-développés suite aux conséquences des conflits entretenus par les transferts internationaux irresponsables des armes.

Le conflit armé a coûté tous les ans en Afrique une moyenne de \$18 milliards depuis 1990.

Les réunions des commissions préparatoires de l'ONU en 2011 vont se prononcer sur les éléments essentiels à considérer en tenant compte des caractéristiques et spécificités de chaque région et Etats membres de l'ONU mais il est à espérer que les normes communes contraignantes sur le transfert des armes classiques prenant en compte le droit international humanitaire et les droits humains seront acceptés par les Etats membres en 2012 lors de la conférence des Nations Unies sur le Traité sur le commerce des armes. A l'instar de la participation coordonnée et harmonisée de l'Afrique lors de l'élaboration du Programme d'action des Nations Unies sur les armes légères en juillet 2001, avec l'adoption d'une position commune africaine en décembre 2000 à Bamako, l'Union Africaine pourrait initier un processus de consultation avec tous les Etats membres pour déterminer une position commune africaine sur le TCA en vue d'une participation effective des Etats africains à la conférence de l'ONU de 2012.

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By Mohamed Coulibaly  
Programme Manager, Ecowas Small Arms  
Control Programme.

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## Silaha haramu zaendelea kuenea Afrika

### *Illegal arms persist in Africa*

Umoja wa Ulaya katika hilo umeungwa mkono na nchi kadhaa wakati wa mjadala wa ufunguzi katika Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa mjini New York Marekani kujadili hatua za kukomesha biashara haramu ya silaha ndogo ndogo na silaha nyepesi.

Mnamo mwaka wa 2008, Katibu Mkuu wa Umoja wa Mataifa Ban Ki-Moon alisema idadi sahihi ya silaha ndogo ndogo zinazosambazwa duniani haijulikani. Katibu huyo mkuu alikua akitoa taarifa kufuatilia uchapishaji wa ripoti amboyo kuhusu usambazaji wa silaha ndogo ndogo ulimwenguni. Katika ripoti hiyo, takrimu silaha milioni 875 zinasambaa ulimwenguni, ikiwa ni pamoja na idadi ya silaha hizo zinazouzwa kinyume na sheria duniani kote.

Barani Afrika kumetokea visa kadha ambavyo vinadhibitisha jinzi silaha hizo haramu zinavyosambazwa kwa njia ya siri. Kwa mfano mwezi wa Novemba mwaka

wa 2010, nchi ya Nigeria ilimesema kuwa itaishitaki nchi ya Iran katika Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa, iwapo itagundua kuna ushahidi wowote kwamba shehena ya silaha haramu iliyokamatwa kwenye pwani ya Nigeria, zilikiuka vikwazo vya Umoja wa Mataifa. Bara la Afrika linahesabiwa kuwa na soko kubwa zaidi na lenye faida kubwa la silaha haramu duniani. Utumizi mbaya wa silaha haramu barani Afrika husababisha vifo vya maelfu ya watu, ili hali mamilioni hugeuka wakimbizi wa ndani na wengine kuyahama makazi yao na kuwa wakimbizi kwenye nchi jirani.

Tangu mwaka 1991, nchi ya Somalia imeshuhudia vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe, na hadi sasa nchi nchi hiyo haina serikali kuu yenye uwezo wa kudhibiti maeneo yake. Silaha haramu zinazidi kutumika kwenye vita hivyo. Ukosefu wa sheria umeifanya Somalia kuwa daraja la biashara haramu ya silaha na madawa ya kulevya na hata binadamu. Ukosefu wa serikali umesababisha kutokua na uajibikaji.

Kwa hivyo wachuuzi wa silaha haramu hukwepa udhibiti na kuziingiza silaha hizo katika soko la magendo kwa urahisi.

Repoti juu ya uuzaji wa silaha ulimwenguni unaonyesha kwamba zaidi ya kampuni 1,000 kutoka nchi 100 zinahusika na utengenezaji wa silaha ndogo ndogo wenye thamani ya mabilioni ya dola kila mwaka. Bara la Afrika lisipotilia maanani kupiga vita biashara haramu ya silaha haramu, bara hili limeendelea kuumia, huku nchi zinazotengeneza silaha hizo zikiendelea kunawiri.

Mnamo mwaka 2001 Umoja wa Mataifa ulipitisha mpango wa utekelezaji dhidi ya biashara haramu ya silaha ndogo ndogo na silaha nyepesi lakini sio vifungu vyote vya mpango huo vimetekelezwa. Kwa vile bara la Afrika ndilo limeadhirika zaidi, inafaa nchi zote barani humu kuunga mkono hatua kama hii ya mwaka 2001, pamja na hatua nyinginezo zinazo ambatana nahii hatua.

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By Nelson Alusala

## Soft border approach to preventing armed violence in Abyei

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*Movement of goods and people from Juba to Khartoum on the White Nile. A soft border approach would safeguard the freedom of such historical activities. Photo Credit: Nelson Alusala/2010*

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The successful conclusion of the long-awaited referendum in Sudan marked the first step of a state building process for South Sudan. As widely expected, the referendum saw an overwhelming majority of voters favouring the formation of an independent South Sudan state. The expected ushering in of a new state to the community of nations has also been marked by suggestions for a new name for the “baby nation”. Some of these suggestions include Republic of Ecuatoria, The Nile Republic, The Anyindi Democratic State, and Juwama (derived from the first two letters of each of the regional capitals Juba, Wau and Malakal). The proliferation of suggestions for the new name underpins the excitement that the people of South Sudan and their supporters feel towards the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the country.

While the end of the lengthy civil war against the Khartoum government seems to be over formally, the reality is that South Sudan is just embarking on the first step in a long process of developing a secure state with sustainable peace. Despite the widespread positive attitude among the political elite of South Sudan, there are many more challenges to overcome before the independence of South Sudan can be called a success. One such issue is the border management approach that both the North and the South will adopt, especially regarding the simmering Abyei border demarcation challenge.

Underpinning the Abyei conflict are armed factions from both the North and the South who continue to attack each other spontaneously. If left unattended to, this can reignite the conflict. A referendum on Abyei

that was envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) appears to have been sidelined by the prominence given to the national referendum, which was indeed a good thing as any further delay to the referendum would have resulted into far much worse repercussions. Abyei is already divided between opposed rebel groups that continue to fight over the future of Abyei and if a clear political agreement regarding border demarcation in this area cannot be reached, it is very likely that the status of Abyei will be decided by military means, in which case the new-born state will relapse into armed conflict.

Given the historical interdependence of the communities living in the Abyei area, the most logical approach would be to adopt a soft border. This should be informed by the notion of transnational citizenship and relational sovereignty, which will legitimise unhindered co-existence of the inhabitants on both sides of the border. Furthermore, a soft border would be realistic considering that the North and the South have yet to tackle the issues of oil and its production, transportation and marketing; currency; security; water; grazing pastures in areas such as Abyei and the Nuba Mountains; citizenship; and international treaties and agreements.

There is a symbiotic relationship between the two regions, as the production of oil, which gives the South 98 per cent of its overall annual revenues, is located in the South while the export terminals are located in the North. Besides depending heavily on the oil, the North also relies on the trade with the South and the free movement of its nomadic tribes, such as the Messeriya, to the southern grazing lands.

In their post-referendum negotiations, North and South should therefore agree on a broad framework for cross-border arrangements, taking into consideration the fundamental issues of citizenship, cross-border movement and seasonal migration, as well as economic activity and security. To achieve this, it is advisable that both parties agree on an arrangement that mutually benefits them by lessening the potential impact of where exactly the boundaries are drawn, especially in the contested regions. In this way, the potential for post-referendum armed violence will be reduced drastically.

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Nelson Alusala

## Improving arms transfers controls in French-speaking Sub-Saharan African states

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It is very difficult to accurately assess the role played by French-speaking Sub-Saharan African states in the international arms trade, because information on this subject is disparate and incomplete. Although it has been established that these countries import military material, figures on their production capacity and exports are particularly scarce. It is likely that, on a global scale, the quantity of these transfers is insignificant. However, some of these transactions have had and continue to have significant ramifications on regional security and socio-economic development. These countries have also frequently been at the centre of irresponsible or illegal transfers, including exports and re-exports at the regional level <sup>1</sup>. The irresponsible transfer and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons by certain states, combined with the fact that these arms are sometimes diverted to inexpedient recipients, have undeniably affected the security and socio-economic situation in the region and will continue to do so. In order to face these challenges, efficient mechanisms to control arms transfers are needed. However, a closer look at national regulation, legislation and procedures in French-speaking states in Sub-Saharan Africa highlights the long way ahead to establish transfers control systems up to speed with the current international and regional arms situation <sup>2</sup>.

Regulations in the above-mentioned countries are often outmoded and incomplete. Much of the regulations were drafted shortly after these countries achieved independence, while other laws date from before independence. Certain regulations were drafted or updated during the 1990s and during the first few years of the new century, but failed to take into account recent developments in international and sub-regional standards on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and arms transfers.

Concerning the arms covered, national regulations often fall short of providing a comprehensive coverage of conventional arms. In general there are two examples of

national regulations: legislation covering conventional arms but excluding those of the security forces, and regulations covering firearms exclusively, and excluding other kinds of conventional weapons. In many French-speaking Sub-Saharan African countries, the arms held by the security forces (and sometimes by other public forces maintaining security and order) are not included in the scope of national legislation on arms and ammunition. These arms are therefore covered by separate texts, to which public access is extremely difficult or indeed impossible. Whatever the reason (whether a culture of secrecy at government departments or inadvertent communication-related problems), this lack of transparency drastically limits the ability of industry, civil society, other countries, or even other national authority representatives to obtain information about what is likely to be the bulk of arms transferred to and from the countries concerned. Any effort at transparency and accountability is further hampered by the lack of legislative reference to a periodic reporting procedure. Authorities responsible for arms transfers are not legally bound to communicate with the legislative power before or after the transfer of arms.

Concerning the main transactions and activities covered, national regulations often focus mainly on arms imports. Brokering is barely mentioned. The lack of clear definitions when it comes to the different transactions and activities can also be underlined as a significant shortcoming of some legislative texts and regulations in several French-speaking states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the operational mechanisms in the activities covered by national legislation are often limited. Indeed, the operational criteria used by authorities to decide whether to grant an import licence to an operator are, for instance, rarely defined. When these criteria are actually defined, they exclusively involve character or age-based requirements relating to the operator, for example a clean legal record.

The recent regional initiatives on SALW however represent a positive step toward stronger transfers control systems in French-speaking Sub-Saharan African states. In an attempt to restrict the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW and to mitigate their devastating impact, Sub-Saharan Africa has been involved in the process regulating SALW flows for around ten years. Four regional instruments for controlling SALW have been put in place and reflect a very broadly shared perception among the local authorities,

international institutions and civil society organisations that SALW cause the most damage in Africa. Regulating their movement therefore represents a priority for improving security on the continent. Regional legal instrument provisions on SALW are on many levels significantly robust and some of them set an example at an international level.

But in the regions where these instruments have entered into force, few states have actually transposed these provisions into their national legislation or applied them effectively. Nevertheless, several countries in different regions have initiated review processes which are expected to lead to the adoption of new laws and procedures in the next few years. These review processes could constitute fruitful opportunities for states, as some of them could decide to extend the majority of the measures on SALW, particularly those on the system for controlling transfers or the definition of certain terms such as transit or brokering, to their entire national systems for controlling the transfer of conventional weapons. This could allow the rectification of many shortcomings in their current national transfers control systems.

While United Nations member states are currently involved in the negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), it cannot be denied that an ATT will constitute a challenge for African states in many different respects. Establishing common international

standards on the transfer of arms requires prior knowledge of the regulations and practices currently in force at national level. This exercise is essential in order to pinpoint aspects that need to be enhanced for these systems to fully function in accordance with an ATT. One can only hope that the current national review processes in several French-speaking Sub-Saharan African states to comply with commitments made at a regional level are led thoroughly and comprehensively. On the longer term, the stakes are surely high: transparency and accountability in the field of arms transfers and efficient transfers control systems are key ingredients in reducing armed violence, be it war or crime, and supporting economic and social development.

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Virginie Moreau, Cédric Poitevin and  
Jihan Seniora

<sup>1</sup> Different reports by the United Nations Groups of Experts responsible for monitoring sanctions have highlighted a number of “irresponsible” arms exports or re-exports to and from French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>2</sup> This article is based on the latest GRIP report on Arms transfer controls – The example of French-speaking States in Sub-Saharan Africa, available in French and English. <http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/dev.asp?N=simple&O=790>



## Securing Africa's nuclear resources

**F**inding the balance between security and development is one of the most challenging aspects of the international nuclear security regime.

Although the need to better secure nuclear and other radioactive material and associated technologies has been on the international agenda for many years, it has taken on heightened significance in recent times. The reasons for this are firstly the uncovering in 2004 of an international nuclear smuggling ring, the A.Q. Kahn network, which consisted of citizens from various countries spreading sensitive nuclear technologies without authorisation, and secondly post-9/11 evidence that Al Qaeda-linked groups have an interest in acquiring or developing a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and in particular a nuclear or radiological explosive device. Sources of radiological and nuclear material include nuclear research reactors, nuclear power plants, radiological sources in hospitals, uranium and mines that produce uranium as a by-product.

In April 2009, US President Obama, in response to the growing demand for a nuclear weapon-free world, presented an ambitious three-part strategy to address international nuclear threats in general, and the increase in the risk of nuclear material diversion and illicit trafficking in particular, by: 1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear weapon arsenals; 2) strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and 3) preventing "terrorists" from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to the last mentioned, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has categorised four potential nuclear security risks, namely:

- Theft of a nuclear weapon;
- The acquisition of nuclear materials for the construction of nuclear explosive devices;
- The malicious use of radioactive sources, including in so-called "dirty bombs"; and
- The radiological hazards caused by an attack on or sabotage of a facility or transport vehicle.<sup>2</sup>

The responsibility for securing nuclear and radioactive materials ultimately rests with individual states. However, countries tend to rely on a number of international instruments and acknowledged principles to guide their control of nuclear and other radioactive materials. According to the IAEA, "this broad range instruments (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a framework for using such material safely

and securely in ways that protect all States - both those with active nuclear programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities"<sup>3</sup>. However, not all states adhere to the existing body of regulations governing nuclear security, and many have not implemented them effectively through their national legal and regulatory frameworks. This has led to gaps in the system that could potentially be exploited by armed non-state actors or other criminal networks.

The African continent is blessed with abundant uranium deposits and countries such as Niger, Namibia and South Africa are some of the main suppliers of this resource to the international community. As such, African states have a key role to play in assisting the international community in securing nuclear and radioactive materials and in implementing Obama's pledge to lead an international effort "to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years", which he concretised during the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington DC in April 2010 and to which Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa were invited.

Notwithstanding the African perception that there is neither a big (if any) risk of a radiological device or WMD attack on the continent, nor a significant threat of nuclear trafficking through the region by domestic or transnational armed non-state actors, the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) has shown that, from January 1993 to December 2009, a total of 1773 incidents were reported globally by participating states and some non-participating states.

To date, there has only been one incident of lower enriched uranium (LEU) trafficking and one known theft of nuclear fuel from a research reactor in Africa. In 1997, eight fuel rods of uranium were stolen from a Kinshasa research reactor. Only one of the rods was recovered and the whereabouts of the remaining rods is still unknown.<sup>4</sup>

Confirmed incidents of natural uranium smuggling have been comparatively low in Africa, with only 12 such incidents occurring between 1994 and 2005. These took place in Tanzania (four incidents), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Namibia and South Africa (two incidents each). Most of the incidents involve stolen uranium ore, usually stored in containers, from unidentified sources. The deterioration of security around mining sites in the DRC due to political instability probably represents the most pressing nuclear security challenge

in Africa today. Of particular concern is the



*The Institute for Security Studies hosted an experts' workshop on "Securing Africa's Nuclear Resources" from 1-2 February 2011.  
Photo Credit: Arms Management Programme/2011*

illegal uranium and cobalt mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga Province, where the source material for the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 originated.

In order to explore the current status of nuclear security in Africa, the Institute for Security Studies hosted an experts' workshop on "Securing Africa's Nuclear Resources" from 1-2 February 2011. Participants included officials from: National Nuclear Regulator (NNR), South Africa; Department of Energy, South Africa; Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA), South Africa; Africa Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA); the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), South Africa; Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom), South Africa; the African Union (AU); the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA), Nigeria; the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNABA); the Nigeria Research Reactor, Nigeria; the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, Ghana; the Atomic Energy and Radiation Protection Authority of the Ministry of Health and Social Services, Namibia; the UK High Commission, South Africa; and the Embassy of the United States of America, South Africa.

The result was a final document that sets out implementable actions on nuclear security issues that African states could take, or lobby for, at the international, regional, sub-regional, and national levels. These actions include:

- Greater participation of African states, including the African Union, in the

follow-up meeting of the international nuclear security summit to be held in Seoul, South Korea, in 2012;

- Accession to and compliance with relevant international legal instruments on terrorism and international organised crime, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, as well as the implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, such as UNSC 1540;
- Ratification and compliance with existing international nuclear security conventions, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment;
- Support for the full implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and its soon-to-be established African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE);
- Encouraging the African Commission on Nuclear Energy to liaise closely with both the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research,

Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) and the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA), to avoid duplication of effort and to prevent gaps;

- Putting in place, where they do not exist, national nuclear regulators and the appropriate institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring on all aspects of the peaceful application of nuclear and other radioactive materials;
- Drafting effective policies, legislation and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security, and taking steps to ensure the safety of nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities, as well as improving import and export controls; and
- Enhancing the capacity of national law enforcement officials to deal with the trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, including appropriate training in investigative procedures, border control and the upgrading of equipment and resources.<sup>5</sup>

It was agreed that the continent's nuclear safety measures should be strengthened in order to reduce the threat of criminal

elements, armed non-state actors and other unauthorised persons or organisations acquiring nuclear and radiological materials. Participants however also agreed that, given the developmental benefits of nuclear and other radioactive materials for Africa, the continued delivery of these benefits need to be ensured.

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Amelia Broodryk and Noel Stott


<sup>1</sup> U.S. President Barack Obama. U.S. Embassy in Prague. 5 April 2009. <http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html>

<sup>2</sup> Mohamed ElBaradei, 'Nuclear Terrorism: Identifying and Combating the Risks', 16 March 2005.

<sup>3</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 'Adherence to international legal instruments'. [http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/legal\\_instruments.asp?s=4&l=29](http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/legal_instruments.asp?s=4&l=29)

<sup>4</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment, 2007. <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/>

<sup>5</sup> A full copy of the workshop report and action plan can be accessed at <http://wmdafricafiles.blogspot.com/>





## Possibilities of pinstamping: Benefits and challenges of marking weapons in Southern Africa

From 21 to 22 February 2011, representatives from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states attended a two-day workshop in Pretoria, South Africa, on weapons marking. The workshop, hosted by the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), introduced participants to the principles of "pinstamping", the process of physically marking firearms with a unique identification code that allows for easier tracking and tracing of weapons. The impetus for the training comes from Article 9 of the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, which declares that state parties must "establish agreed systems to ensure that all firearms are marked with a unique number". The February workshop represents the first step in a long process of standardising the marking of weapons

within SADC member states.

The ISS and the Mines Advisory Group, through a grant from the United States government, will provide pinstamp marking units to each member state over the coming months (Tanzania has already received a pinstamp unit through a different grant). Traceability Solutions and its alliance partner, Forensic Authentication Commodity Track Trace (FACTT), will supply the pinstamp units and provide the primary maintenance and service of the machines. Each unit includes a marking head, controller, cables, scanner, mounting post, vice and software. Traceability Solutions and FACTT conducted the hands-on training during the workshop and emphasised both the machines and the software. Further training and support will be provided once the pinstamp units have been transported to each country.

Workshop participants remarked that the portable, user-friendly, permanent marking system offers immeasurable possibilities in

the struggle against the illegal transfer of weapons. However, some representatives were less sanguine, acknowledging not only the benefits, but also the many challenges of marking weapons. One such challenge relates to the pinstamp operator's ability to accurately enter the firearm manufacturer's serial number into the software program and align it with the new pinstamp code. A single missed digit or incorrectly matched pinstamp will significantly hinder the traceability of the weapon. Even though there are software measures to guard against these mistakes, it will still require diligence on the part of the operator.

In addition to the practical challenges of operating the pinstamp units, there are many policy hurdles to overcome. For instance, it is not uncommon for a country to allow parts of one firearm to be interchanged with parts from another, similar firearm. In such cases it will be necessary to determine which parts of the weapon need to be marked with a pin-



"Pinstamping", the process of physically marking firearms with a unique identification code that allows for easier tracking and tracing of weapons. Photo Credit: Arms Management Programme/2011

code. Deciding on the procedures to mark these “cannibalised” weapons will require coordination from all SADC states.

In terms of tracking civilian firearms, another challenge will be for countries to link marked firearms with their correct owner. Without this critical step, there will be very little accountability built into the system, thereby making it very difficult to combat illicit arms trading. Therefore, a steady policy process of formulating the appropriate procedures, adopting and implementing those measures, and then evaluating their success will be required.

Kyle Parker, Director of Traceability Solutions, stresses that the benefits of pinstamping firearms far outweigh the challenges involved in the process. He points out that the South African Police Service (SAPS) has successfully used the pinstamp units since 1994. He also maintains that “training is unlimited” and includes telephone, email and on-site support, and that there “hasn’t been anyone [they] haven’t been able to teach”. The director’s comments notwithstanding, there remains the daunting task of implementing the necessary policies and procedures for using the marking machines.

In the coming months, each member state will receive a pinstamp unit as well as in-country training on how to use the device and software. Although the representatives at the training session most likely will not operate the units, they will be responsible for executing their home countries’ plans of action for marking weapons and instrumental in providing oversight throughout all facets of the marking operation. For that reason, it is mission critical that the representatives take ownership of the pinstamping process.

Since the SADC Firearms Protocol came into force in 2004, momentum has gathered to establish an agreed upon system to mark firearms and maintain proper records of those markings. In spite of the policy and implementation challenges that remain, the SARPCCO workshop provided a forum to start the process of creating a mechanism to control the movement of weapons in Southern Africa. As Reeshideo Soobhug, a representative from Mauritius, reasoned, “we may not be able to eradicate illicit gun trafficking completely, but we can better manage the process”. At this stage it is unclear how effective pinstamping will be. However, as Reeshideo Soobhug also observed, “it will take time, but we have to start somewhere”.

## Understanding and addressing China’s arms alliances in Africa

China’s willingness to sell arms to conflict-ridden countries in Africa, particularly Sudan and Zimbabwe, has heightened the prospect of armed violence by perpetuating instability. China’s total arms sales are dwarfed by countries such as the United States and Russia; however, their arms exports to Africa have increased considerably in recent years, with a significant portion of those weapons distributed to “weak” or “failing” states.<sup>1</sup> Ian Taylor, author of several publications on China’s arms sales to Africa, states that as recently as 2006 China sold over \$55.5 billion worth of weapons to African states, and it is predicted that the total will reach \$100 billion in the near future. In fact, as Richard A. Bitzinger of the Jamestown Foundation points out, China’s arms sales to Africa are expanding so fast that between 2004 and 2007 China was the single largest weapons supplier to Africa. If China continues to trade arms with repressive regimes in Africa, it will not only destabilise the long-term security of the countries and regions to which the arms are sent, but will also threaten the human security of the average African. Therefore, the question for the African community is how to influence China’s Africa policy, especially regarding their arms trade with “weak” and “failing” states.

China’s most controversial arms alliance in Africa has been with the government of North Sudan. Beijing officially began selling arms to Khartoum in 1981, reaching a total value of \$342 million by 2006.<sup>2</sup> In 2005, the UN passed an arms embargo on Sudan, barring sales to any party involved in the conflict in Darfur. While the Chinese government claims they have honoured the embargo, a 2007 Amnesty International report points out that Chinese-made small arms and aircrafts were used by the Sudanese government in attacks on civilians. One account alleges that the Sudanese Air Force used Chinese A-5 “Fantan” attack fighter jets in indiscriminate bombing raids on villages in Darfur and eastern Chad. The sale of these weapons might have pre-dated the embargo, making them technically legal, but the sales clearly facilitated human rights abuses.

Although the most prominent Chinese

arms alliance has been with Sudan, their relationship with Zimbabwe has been just as perverse and counterproductive. After the 2002 arms embargo on Zimbabwe by Western countries, China was one of the only arms suppliers left, an opportunity China viewed as advantageous. In 2004, a \$240 million covert arms deal was revealed, exposing the extent of their relationship. China’s deals with Zimbabwe did not just include major conventional weapons. In addition to shipments of small arms and light weapons (SALW), Ian Taylor reported that Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe had also ordered water cannons for his internal-security forces to subdue protesters and bugging equipment to monitor the cell phone calls of his political enemies.<sup>3</sup> Mugabe has used the arms he received from China as a political tool against his domestic enemies.

In April 2008, a Chinese shipping vessel fully loaded with arms intended for sale in Zimbabwe was prevented from unloading at a dock in South Africa. Dockworkers and human rights activists refused to allow the ship to unload its contents, reported by Arms Control Today to include assault rifles, mortar shells and three million rounds of ammunition. Several news organisations reported that the weapons most likely made it to their destination via Congo-Brazzaville, from where the arms were sent to Zimbabwe by plane. Considering the ongoing political conflict in Zimbabwe at the time, arms transfers like this further militarised an already unstable situation. This incident, dubbed the “ship of shame”, is a microcosm of the conundrum that the Chinese government finds itself in when it comes to selling arms to unstable African states.

Therefore, it is imperative to understand China’s Africa policy and subsequently to devise a plan to support, encourage, and insist on a change in their policy. China’s Africa policy dates back to the adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which was set out by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1953. The Five Principles – namely mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence – have become norms for



the Chinese government's dealings with African countries. In 2006, former Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing issued an official policy paper on Africa, recommitting China's adherence to the Five Principles. In the paper, non-interference formed the nucleus of China's Africa policy.

For thousands of years, China has identified more with the rights of the group than with the rights of the individual. So China's cultural understanding of "human rights" is arguably different from African and Western interpretations. Also, China's colonial past allows them to identify with the sovereign aspirations of the African people. For those reasons, it is not productive to dismiss China's claims of non-interference outright. Furthermore, China is very sensitive to criticism, feeling that they "lose face" if criticised publicly. Therefore, an alternative to "globally shaming" China's arms sales may garner better, more long-lasting results. Working to understand the historical and cultural makeup of China allows for a diplomatic and nuanced approach to resolving their at times irresponsible arms deals.

In contemporary China there are three broad trends that provide an opportunity for African policy makers to influence China's arms trade in Africa. Firstly, a host of different interest groups, including new media and research institutions, are striving to redefine China's foreign policy. Appealing to the growing nuances in China's foreign policy establishment may place pressure on government officials to rethink their arms sales with unstable regimes in Africa. Secondly, China's foreign policy interests are gradually conflicting with their values, putting stress on China's strict adherence to the principle on non-interference. Lastly, with Vice President Xi Jinping (a fifth-generation leader) poised to take over as President in 2012 and several sixth-generation leaders moving into high-ranking posts, the political dynamics in China are slowly changing. With Sino-African ties advancing economically, politically, and culturally, it is necessary to persuade the new Chinese leaders to address the sale of arms to "weak" and "failing" states in Africa.

The author Dr. Samuel Kim claims that, "China has no principles, only interests, driving its arms sales to the Third World". However, his comments are only partially true, and they are in tension with another partial truth: Respect for the sovereign rights

of every nation justifies China's arms sales to the Third World. Of course arms trading by its very nature is a form of interference, especially when the arms provided are used in campaigns of torture, intimidation or murder of innocent civilian populations, as they have been in Zimbabwe and Sudan. Considering this dichotomy, understanding China's Africa policy and evolving national interests is critical to finding a permanent solution to China's arms sales to repressive African regimes.

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Scott Maxwell

<sup>1</sup> Midford, Paul and Indra de Soysa (2010) forcefully argue that the US transfers greater amounts of arms to autocratic African regimes when compared with China. However, the data used in their study does not account for the transfer of small arms and light weapons, limiting the depth of their research.

<sup>2</sup> Yitzhak Shichor, Sudan: neo-colonialism with Chinese characteristics, in Arthur Waldron (ed), *China in Africa*, Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, 79.

<sup>3</sup> Ian Taylor, *China's new role in Africa*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2009, 124.

# Southern Sudan & disarmament: prospects, challenges and opportunities

**A**s we witness the birth of the world's newest nation, South Sudan, many security challenges lie ahead in the construction of the state. One fundamental internal challenge is building unity, cohesion and integration on an individual and national level among the diverse Southern communities. Sustainable unity towards building a Southern identity will only be recognised in an environment of mutual trust. In order to do so, civilian disarmament is a prerequisite. This calls for a carefully organised, integrated and non-violent approach that would effectively sensitise and incentivise disarmament and arms control among civilians.

According to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), previous disarmament campaigns have been relatively successful in terms of small arms recovered. Other quarters differ, claiming that such initiatives have failed and often become counterproductive in the long term. This can be attributed to cultural practices whereby community members choose to hoard small arms and light weapons (SALW) for their commercial value, for defense against aggression from ethnic rivals and as ammunition for cattle raiding. Until solutions to these fundamental problems are applied, the GoSS may very well be chasing its own tail.

One of the key drivers of the proliferation of arms in South Sudan is the existence of a pastoralist economy - a livelihood susceptible to climatic changes and often the source of inter-ethnic competition. The precarious nature of this economy creates a situation whereby SALW are employed both as defensive instruments and as valuable tradable commodities that are often considered to be assets. For example, according to a small arms survey conducted in 2007, an AK-47 is said to fetch \$86 in Sudan.

Unless the political economy of South Sudan is structurally transformed, peace and security will remain elusive. If the pastoralist economy prevails, proliferation of SALW will continue. It is therefore in the interest of the GoSS to institute holistic economic diversification programs in its development agenda. For example, commercial ranching for beef should be introduced to gradually replace the pastoral economy and streamline cattle farming into a more viable business venture. Construction, manufacturing and service production are also activities that would encourage development and diversify

the economy and skills of the South Sudanese.

Another challenge is the antagonism between the state's security force (SPLA) and the civilians. It has emerged that SPLA has in the past conducted civilian disarmament in a violent manner that has evoked retaliation from civilians. The Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (IDDRP), developed on 1 July 2005, spells out the policy of *iDo No harmi* as a guiding principle, which means that arms reduction and control activities should be designed and implemented in such a way that it is safe, controlled, transparent, sustainable and replicable. Yet civilian disarmament has presented the SPLA with an opportunity to quash and disarm rebel opposition groups. This confrontation turned bloody during the 2006 disarmament campaign and left an estimated 500 SPLA soldiers and an unknown number of civilians dead.

The GoSS must transform the culture and mentality of SPLA from a being a violent liberation movement into a legitimate military machine with the responsibility to protect citizens. The use of excessive force in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) will yield the process counterproductive and futile. Restraint and sensitisation may be far more fruitful in a society that has for centuries believed in the use of force and ammunition. This would also help institute the culture of dialogue and consultative processes.

The fight against illicit arms calls for multi-stakeholder approaches that optimally combine multilateral, regional and domestic legal and institutional frameworks for arms control.

Arising from the regional challenges to peace and security in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region, the new state must cooperate with neighbouring Northern Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea (on the eastern and southern side). In October 2007, Sudan (Khartoum) ratified the Nairobi Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Prior to this, a National Focal Point (NFP) was appointed in 2004.

Other international instruments that would be vital for the fight against SALW would be: the UN Program of Action (2001), UN Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms (2001), Bamako Declaration on an African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW (2000), and the Arms Trade Treaty (2003).

The establishment of the new state of South Sudan comes against a backdrop of the signing of the Kinshasa Convention, which introduces control and regulation of SALW within and across borders. The instrument has been applauded for its relevance, timeliness and scope, mainly because it is believed to introduce a regulatory framework in the volatile Central African Region. Among the signatories are Chad, Central African Republic (neighbouring Northern Sudan) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (bordering South Sudan). It would therefore be in the interest of the governments in Khartoum and Juba to engage in this new arms deal so that they can benefit from shared experiences of best practices with fellow signatories.

The formation of the South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (SSBCSA) in 2007 was laudable in disarmament efforts. Officials have since visited the NFPs in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia to tap into lessons learnt from its neighbours in structure, operations, capacities and priorities in SALW management. The visit also helped consolidate the pledged support for Sudan's participation in regional forums, instruments, technical capacity and regional cooperation.

Consultations were also held with the Khartoum government so as to liaise with Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Commissions (NSDDRRCs). Contact was made with the NFP on SALW. Out of these engagements, a common strategy was created between the North and the South. Several tangible outcomes and recommendations came out from this mission, such as the establishment of joint North-South committees on community security and arms control; the development of a common workplan for the three transitional border areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile and Southern Kodofan/Nuba Mountains; the drafting and harmonisation of firearms possessions laws and collaboration in the area of weapons marking and registration.

On a national level, the GoSS needs to enact and update regulations regarding possession of firearms, catalyse effective DDR among ex-combatants to limit arms circulation among civilians, and undertake effective arms registration and effective and peaceful civilian disarmament. Thus far, as mentioned earlier, the disarmament has been erratic, violent and

unrewarding, as civilians have claimed that they have not been duly compensated. Many civilians say that the disarmament process has exposed them to greater insecurity due to inter-ethnic hostilities.

Civil society participation is also paramount in building awareness of the danger of owning illegal arms, diversification of the local economy,

reconciliation and the practice of harmonious inter-community existence. This should be done with caution, as there have been claims that some NGOs have become partial actors within South Sudan's internal politics. In 2006, a disarmament campaign failed partly because some NGOs helped create mounting opposition against the SPLA/Government

The international community also has a role in providing impartial technical and financial support and in training police and local authorities for disarmament. In this way, the task of arms control and disarmament will remain within the jurisdiction of the local authorities, rather than a military affair.

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Nyambura Kimani



## Important Arms Control Dates

### May to July 2011

2 – 6 May	IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna
9 – 13 May	Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons: New York
9 – 13 May	UN Programme of Action on Small Arms experts meeting: New York
16 May – July	Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings: Geneva
27 – 29 June	The 23rd United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues: Matsumoto, Japan
27 – 30 June	Convention on Cluster Munitions (informal) intersessional meetings: Geneva
11 – 15 July	Arms Trade Treaty 3rd preparatory meeting: New York

### August to October 2011

1 August	1 <sup>st</sup> anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
2 August – 16 September	Conference on Disarmament, Part Three: Geneva
22 – 26 August	Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts' debate on an Optional Protocol 6 on cluster munitions: Geneva
12-16 September	IAEA Board of Governors: Vienna
12 – 16 September	Convention on Cluster Munitions 2nd Meeting of States Parties: Beirut
3 October – 1 November	First Committee: New York

### November to December 2011

14 – 25 November	Convention on Conventional Weapons 4th Review Conference: Geneva
17 – 18 November	IAEA Board of Governors: Vienna
28 November – 2 December	11th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) on Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APLC): Phnom Penh, Cambodia
5 – 22 December	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference: Geneva





## Supporting the implementation of arms control and disarmament initiatives at the national and regional levels



# AMP

## Arms Management Programme

### Background

Africa is a diverse continent in terms of culture, language and geography. Achieving sustainable peace and development in many African countries is forestalled by violent conflict, poverty and weak state capacity. This situation is exacerbated by the availability of small arms and light weapons, the distribution of landmines and other explosive remnants of war, as well as the potential threat posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Despite these dynamics, inter-governmental organisations, national governments and civil society groupings in Africa have taken significant steps to control and prevent the proliferation of arms and reduce incidents of armed violence.

The Arms Management Programme (AMP) at the ISS has been working on arms control and disarmament issues in Africa for more than a decade - undertaking policy-oriented research, transferring knowledge and providing training to key government and civil society stakeholders. AMP facilitates workshops, seminars and conferences in support of the implementation of relevant international and regional arms control and disarmament protocols, treaties and conventions.

### Goals

The two main goals of AMP are:

- To contribute to disarmament initiatives in Africa and to the implementation of effective arms management and control measures;
- To increase knowledge about the relationship between arms, violence and development

It pursues these goals by:

- Supporting and facilitating the implementation of arms control and disarmament initiatives at the local, national, regional and continental levels, and sharing the lessons from these efforts with the international community.
- Collecting and analysing information that will influence the formulation and implementation of arms control and disarmament policies and legislation.
- Providing capacity building and training to appropriate stakeholders.

AMP works closely with a number of official intergovernmental and sub-regional bodies, such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO), and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), and a number of civil society organisations.

Internationally, AMP actively supports the implementation of the United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects – a key global process to tackle the illicit trade in small arms.

In addition, the programme seeks to identify and strengthen Africa's role in international efforts to reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament as it relates to weapons of mass destruction in the context of Africa's developmental imperatives. Thematically this project engages with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba); the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; the Chemical Weapons Convention; and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions such as UNSCR 1540.

## Source of Information

AMP serves as an information resource on many aspects of small arms, light weapons, conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction in Africa. AMP hosts and maintains a collaborative internet-based reference tool for policy makers, researchers, journalists and civil society activists working on these issues. AMP welcomes contributions and partners wishing to play a role in the development of the website. [www.armsnet africa.org](http://www.armsnet africa.org)

AMP produces the quarterly electronic newsletter: Arms Control: Africa which aims to provide relevant, succinct information and analysis on arms and arms control developments that are either taking place within Africa, or which have the potential to have an impact on the continent. The newsletter includes articles in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese and Swahili. Contributions to Arms Control: Africa are welcome, and should be emailed to [aca@issafrica.org](mailto:aca@issafrica.org)



## Donors

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